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Determining the Proper
Pleading Standard Under the
Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 After In re
Silieon Graphies
I. INTRODUCTION
Allegations of securities fraud tend to take a common form, and the
allegations made by Deanna Brody in In re Silicon Graphics' are fairly typical of
those made by similarly situated plaintiffs. Brody filed a securities fraud class
action in the Northern District of California, alleging that six top officers of
Silicon Graphics, Inc. ("SGI") made misleading statements about the success of
the company while at the same time engaging in mass insider trading.2
Subsequent to this trading, the stock price dropped significantly, and investors
like Brody lost substantial amounts of money.3 In support of her allegations,
Brody offered internal reports of SGI showing that the officers of SGI had
knowledge that the company was not going to reach its predicted revenue growth
for Fiscal Year 1996, as well as evidence showing that six officers of SGI engaged
in massive insider trading during that same time period.4 Together, this evidence
established a "reasonable inference of deliberate recklessness"; however, Brody's
claim was dismissed by the district court. 5 The district court's decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 6 The Ninth Circuit held
that Brody failed to meet the new heightened pleading requirements of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") because she failed to state
particular facts giving rise to a "strong inference of deliberate recklessness." '
One would think that if the substance of securities fraud allegations were
common, the relief afforded to them under the laws would be common as well.
However, this is not the case. The circuits have recently split in their interpretations of the substantive and procedural pleading requirements under the PSLRA.
1.
2.
3.
4.

In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 980.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 982, 984.

5.
6.

Id.
Id.

7. Id. (emphasis omitted).
8.
See id. at 974; see also In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding that plaintiffs may plead scienter "by alleging facts giving rise to a strong inference of
recklessness"); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that under
the PSLRA "plaintiffs [may] plead scienter by alleging facts 'establishing a motive and an opportunity to

Unfortunately, Brody had no way of knowing when she decided to file her suit

against SGI in the Ninth Circuit that her ability to enter the courthouse gate and
recover for losses could be limited by the court's interpretation of the pleading
requirements under the PSLRA. 9
To recover for losses resulting from securities fraud, plaintiffs may seek a
private cause of action under Section 10(b)' ° and Rule lOb-5" of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.12 Historically, pleading securities fraud under this Act
required a higher standard of pleading than that required for most other actions. 3
In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule lOb-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a plaintiff must allege "reliance on material
misstatements or omissions which were made [by the defendants] with scienter
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.' 4 The interpretation of this
heightened pleading requirement can be separated into two basic questions: the
substantive question, regarding what constitutes an actionable state of mind in
securities fraud cases, and the procedural question, regarding the means plaintiffs

commit fraud, or by setting forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence and either reckless or
conscious behavior'); Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
"a plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant., acted with scienter and the scienter, needed to prove
securities fraud is intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud, or knowing misconduct"); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc. 187 F.3d 1271, 1283, 1285 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA "does not prohibit the
practice of alleging scienter by pleading facts that denote severe recklessness" but that "allegations of motive
and opportunity to commit fraud, standing alone, are [not] sufficient to establish scienter").
9. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
10. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the "use or employ[ment], in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission
may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). The elements a plaintiff must establish to make a Section 10(b)
claim are: "(1 ) a false statement or an omission that rendered another statement misleading; (2) materiality;
(3) scienter; (4) loss causation; and (5) damages." Zeid v. Kimberly, 973 F. Supp. 910, 913 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
11.
Rule 1Ob-5 makes it illegal "[to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading ... in connection with the sale or purchase of a security." 17 C.F.R. §
240.1Ob-5 (2000).
12.
See Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and Legislative History:
Which Will Decide The StandardFor PleadingScienter After The PrivateSecuritiesLitigation Reform
Act Of 1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577,580 (1999); see also Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real
Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on
Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (1998); Richard W. Walker & J. Gordon
Seymour, Symposium, Recent Judicialand Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities
Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1998).
13.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all
averments of fraud or mistake, such as those brought under Rule lOb-5, must state "circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake .... with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of
mind of a person may be averred generally." Id.
14.
Miest, supra note 12, at 1108; see also Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that "a claim under section 10(b) ... must allege material misstatements or omissions indicating
an intent to deceive or defraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security").
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may utilize in pleading this state of mind. 's
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, circuit courts had adopted different
interpretations of the level of pleading required by Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
of the Securities Exchange Act.' 6 While all circuits agreed that plaintiffs could
establish the element of scienter by pleading either intent or recklessness, 7 due
to the ambiguity of Rule lOb-5, the circuits split on the specificity of facts
required to make an adequate showing of scienter. 5 In determining the
procedural pleading requirement, both the Second and Ninth Circuits turned to
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 9 In doing so, however, the two

circuits reached drastically different conclusions.2 ° The Ninth Circuit concluded
that facts demonstrating scienter could be plead in either a general or conclusory
manner.2' The Second Circuit, on the other hand, found that while the rule
allowed general pleading as to state of mind, it did not condone conclusory
pleading.22 Thus, the Second Circuit adopted a heightened pleading requirement
in Rule lOb-5 securities fraud actions, thereby requiring plaintiffs to make a
showing of motive and intent or circumstantial evidence of recklessness.23
Acknowledging this split in the circuits, Congress sought to create a uniform
pleading standard when it enacted the PSLRA. 2 4
Unfortunately, the drafters of the PSLRA did not specifically state their intent
See Miest, supra note 12, at 1109; see also Richard L. Jacobson &Joshua R. Martin, The Private
15.
SecuritiesLitigation Reform Act of 1995: A Survey of the FirstThree Years, SD79 ALI-ABA 861, 864
(1999).

16. See Smith, supra note 12, at 580-81.
17.
See Miest, supra note 12, at 1109; see also Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1569-70 (9thCir. 1990), cert. denied,499 U.S. 976 (1991) (accord); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage
Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989) (accord); In re Phillips Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir.
1989) (accord); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982) (accord); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981)
(accord); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979) (accord); Cook
v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that recklessness is an acceptable state of mind
to impose liability in securities fraud actions); Rolfv. Byth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,47 (2d Cir.
1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,1044 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,424 U.S.
875 (1977) (accord). The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit that had not considered the adequacy of
recklessness in establishing scienter in its appellate courts, however, district courts in the Fourth Circuit had
uniformly held prior to the enactment of the PSLRA that allegations of recklessness were adequate to state
a valid cause of action in securities fraud actions. Smith, supra note 12, at 585 n.76.
18. Miest, supra note 12, at 110.
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
20. See In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig. 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993).
21. Smith, supra note 12, at 587; see alsoMiest, supranote 12, at 111; In re GlenFed Inc., 42 F.3d
at 1545.
22. Smith, supra note 12, at 586; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1111-12.
23. In re Time Warner Inc., 9 F.3d at 268-69.
24. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-360, at 36 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679.

for pleading requirements when drafting the language of the PSLRA. As a result,
the language of the statute is somewhat ambiguous in regard to what a plaintiff
must show to make an adequate showing of scienter, and the circuit courts have
again splintered in their interpretations of the pleading requirements for securities
fraud.25 Thus, depending on the circuit in which an action is filed, private
plaintiffs' claims will be more or less likely to survive a motion to dismiss. "
This Comment argues that the interpretation given to the PSLRA's
heightened pleading requirements by the Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphics
contradicts both the plain language and the legislative history of the PSLRA, and
therefore congressional reform or Supreme Court interpretation of the Act is
necessary to allow the Act to have its intended impact. Part II discusses the
difference between the substantive and procedural pleading requirements under
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act and the interpretation of these
requirements by the federal circuit courts prior to the enactment of the PSLRA.27
Part III discusses the legislative history of the PSLRA.2" Part IV discusses the
split between the federal circuits in their interpretations of the PSLRA.2 9 Part V
discusses the impact of the recent decisions interpreting the PSLRA, in particular
the In re Silicon Graphicsdecision, on private plaintiffs, the capital markets, and
the federal courts in general. 30 Finally, Part VI argues that a case similar to In re
Silicon Graphicswill be accepted by the Supreme Court for certiorari, and that
upon review the Court will take a plain language approach to interpreting the
PSLRA and hold that while recklessness survives as an adequate state of mind for
the imposition of liability under the PSLRA, mere allegations of motive and
opportunity will no longer suffice to meet the procedural requirements of Rule
lOb-5 securities fraud actions. 3'
II.. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR
ALLEGATIONS OF SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER RULE 1OB-5
A. Substantive Requirement of Scienter under Rule 10b-5
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, courts found themselves in the position
of having to determine whether intent, recklessness, or negligence sufficed as an
adequate showing of scienter, because Rule lOb-5 failed to explicitly specify the
25. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999); see also in re Comshare, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press
v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc. 187 F.3d 1271 (11 th
Cir. 1999).
26. See supra note 25.
27. See infra notes 32-57 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 58-96 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 97-291 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 292-327 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 328-351 and accompanying text.
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state of mind a defendant must have possessed to be found liable for fraudulent
misrepresentation.32 The Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in the seminal
case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.33 In this case, the Court held that, while
intent would always be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement of Rule lOb5, a mere showing of negligence could never be sufficient to satisfy the scienter
requirement."a However, while the Court gave guidance to the circuit courts as
to the adequacy of intent and negligence in Hochfelder, it failed to make a
specific holding as to the adequacy of recklessness.35 Thus, circuit courts were
left to determine the adequacy of pleading recklessness under Rule lOb-5.36
Subsequently, the circuit courts uniformly held that recklessness was
sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5.37 The most commonly
adopted definition of recklessness was promulgated by the Seventh Circuit in
SunstrandCorp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.3' The Sunstrandcourt defined recklessness as
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it. 39
Under this definition, a defendant could be found reckless when the defendant
knew that there was a "substantial possibility" that a statement made by the
defendant was untrue, or that a statement made by the defendant was not made
with a solid basis for determining its truthfulness. 40 Thus, recklessness, along
with intent, was accepted as a sufficient basis for pleading scienter in securities
fraud cases in all circuits prior to the enactment of the PSLRA. 41

32. Meist, supranote 12, at 1109.
33. Id.; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976).
34. Hochfleder, 425 U.S. at 193-94.
35. See id. at 193-94 n.12.
36. Miest, supra note 12, at 1109-10.
37. See supra note 17 (providing a sample of cases holding that recklessness is an adequate level of
scienter for alleging securities fraud).
38. 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 1045.
40. Miest, supranote 12, at 1109-10; see also William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and
Recklessness Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 34 Hous. L. REV. 121, 169 (1997).
41. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc. 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999); see also supranote 17.

B. ProceduralPleadingRequirementforEstablishingScienterunder Rule
lOb-5
Just as Rule lOb-5 failed to indicate the level of scienter needed to satisfy the
substantive state of mind requirement, Rule lOb-5 also failed to indicate the
specificity of facts needed to satisfy the procedural pleading requirement.42 Prior
to the enactment of the PSLRA, the circuit courts were split as to the specificity
of facts required to satisfy the procedural pleading requirement." In seeking to
interpret the meaning of Rule lOb-5, the courts looked to Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity[;]
[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally." 44 However, the Second and Ninth Circuits gave different
interpretations of this rule, and as a result, a split occurred between the circuits as
to the level of specificity needed to aver securities fraud. 45
The Ninth Circuit interpreted Rule 9(b) as allowing for general and
conclusory pleading as to the defendant's state of mind.' The Ninth Circuit
considered the meaning of Rule 9(b) in In re Glenfed and determined that, under
Rule 9(b), when an allegation of malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of
mind is material to a claim, it is sufficient "to allege the same as a fact without
setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred., 47 The court
found that the rule promulgated by the Second Circuit, which required a pleading
of facts showing motive and opportunity to commit fraud or a strong inference of
circumstantial evidence of recklessness, conflicted with both the plain meaning
of Rule 9(b) and with Ninth Circuit authority. 48 The court further reasoned that
however beneficial it may be to adopt a higher standard of pleading, courts "are
not permitted to add new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because [the courts]
like the effects of doing so." 49 The court recognized that amending or otherwise

altering the interpretation of a rule is not a task for the courts, but is rather a task
for the appropriate rule-making body.50 Thus, prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA, it was sufficient to make general and conclusory statements when
averring scienter in securities fraud cases in the Ninth Circuit. 5'
42. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1110.
43. Id.; see also Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1282.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1110; Smith, supra note 12, at 580-81.
45.
Smith, supra note 12, at 581;see also Miest, supra note 12, at IllO.
46.
Smith, supranote 12, at 587-88; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 111I.
47. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
48. Id. at 1545-46.
49. Id. at 1546.
50. Id.
51.
See id. at 1546-47; see also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that a complaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss when the complaint specified
"the manner in which representations [at
issue] were false and misleading").
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The Second Circuit, however, adopted a much higher pleading standard than
that adopted by the Ninth Circuit.5 2 The Second Circuit, concluding that general,
but not conclusory, pleading was sufficient under Rule 9(b), created a two prong
test, which it outlined in In re Time Warner.53 The court explained that it had
recognized two distinct ways by which a plaintiff could adequately plead specific
facts giving rise to a "'strong inference' of fraudulent intent," or scienter.5 4 The
first means of pleading scienter was by showing both motive and opportunity for
the defendant to commit fraud.55 The alternative means of pleading scienter was
to "allege facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or
conscious behavior" on the part of the defendant.56 Prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA, the Second Circuit pleading standard was the most rigorous of all the
circuit courts'.
,57

III. ENACTMENT OF THE PSLRA
As a result of the ongoing concern of the business community, the legal
community, and the public in general, Congress enacted the PSLRA to "protect
investors, issuers, and all who are associated with [the] capital markets from
abusive securities litigation. '58 One means Congress attempted to utilize to
protect those involved in the capital markets from this abusive litigation was the
adoption of heightened pleading requirements for private securities fraud cases.59
In creating a heightened pleading requirement, Congress sought to resolve the
split between the Second and Ninth Circuits regarding the specificity of facts
required to adequately allege "state of mind," or scienter. 6° The most controversial issue that Congress faced when drafting the PSLRA was the level of
specificity with which it would require plaintiffs to plead in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.6 An examination of the legislative history of the PSLRA
gives useful insight into the intent of Congress in the legislation of this controver52.
Smith, supra note 12, at 586-87; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 111 -12.
53. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2nd Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 268.
55.
Id. at 269.
56. Id.
57. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,534 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the Second Circuit
standard was the most stringent pleading standard prior to the enactment of the PSLRA); see also Smith,
supra note 12, at 586.
58. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,731.
59.
Id.; see also William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section
21D(B)(2) of the Securities ExchangeAct of1934: Motive, Opportunity,Recklessness, and the Private
SecuritiesLitigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 893, 931 (explaining the state of mind
pleading standard under proposed section 1OA(a)); Miest, supra note 12, at 1114-15.
60. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1112.
61.
See id.

sial measure.

A. House Deliberations
Interestingly, the most controversial issue faced in the initial House
deliberations concerned not the procedural question of the proper standard of
pleading for securities fraud actions, but rather the substantive question of the
level of scienter required to impose liability on a defendant for securities fraud.62
In fact, the original House bill, H.R. 10, required plaintiffs to plead direct
evidence of scienter and eliminated liability for recklessness.63 However, after
considerable lobbying by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"),64 the
62. See id. at 1113; see also Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 59, at 930-37 (explaining proposals for
eliminating reckless misconduct liability).
63. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong., (Ist Sess. 1995). This proposed bill would have added a new section
IOA which would have read:
SEC. 10A. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS.
1. SCIENTER-In any action under section 10(b), a defendant may be held liable for money
damages only on proofa. that the defendant made an untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, made, in light of the circumstances in
which they were made, not misleading; and
b. that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at the time it was made, or
intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission would render misleading the
statements made at the time they were made.
2. REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF SCIENTER-In any
action under section 10(b) in which it is alleged that the defendanta. made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
b. omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; the complaint shall allege
specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation
occurred. The complaint shall also specify each statement or omission alleged to have been
misleading and the reasons the statement or omission is misleading. If an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall set forth with
specificity all information on which that belief is formed. Failure to comply fully with this
requirement shall result in dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Id.
64. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt expressed his disapproval of H.R. 10 when testifying before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Commerce. See Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Telecomm. and Finance of the House Comm. On Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 191-221 (1995). In this statement, Chairman Levitt expressed the SEC's fears that the elimination
liability for reckless misconduct was a threat to the integrity of private investors. Id. Chairman Levitt
explained:
[W]e really want corporations-we want executives of corporations-to worry about the accuracy
of their disclosures. It is the best way I know to assure the markets of a continuous stream of
reliable, accurate information. Any higher scienter standard threatens the process that has made
our markets what they are. Indeed, an actual knowledge standard could create a legal incentive
to ignore indications of fraud.
Id. at 194-95. Chairman Levitt went on to urge:
[T]he Commission has consistently supported a recklessness standard because such a standard
is needed to protect the integrity of the disclosure process. The law should sanction corporations
and individuals who act recklessly when making disclosures, because that is the only way to
assure the markets of a continuous streamof accurate information. Any higher scienter standard
would lessen the incentives for corporations and other issuers to conduct a full inquiry into areas
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House committee passed a final version of the bill that had reinstated liability for
recklessness.65 This proposed House version of the bill was ultimately rejected
by the Conference Committee in favor of the Senate version of the bill. 66

B. Senate Deliberations
During the Senate deliberations, the procedural question regarding the
specificity of facts necessary to plead allegations of scienter in securities fraud
actions fully emerged. 67 Both the White House and the SEC lobbied the Senate
Banking Committee to formulate a bill adopting the Second Circuit pleading
standard. 6' The bill developed by the Senate Banking Committee, S. 240,69
contained language adopting the "strong inference" language of the Second
Circuit, but failed to explicitly adopt the Second Circuit's interpretion of this

of potential exposure, and thus threaten the process that has made our markets a model for
nations around the world.
Id. at 202.
65. See 141 CONG. REc. H2862-64 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995). The bill passed by a vote of325 to 99.
See id. The final version of the bill adopted the Sundstrand standard of recklessness, showing the clear
intent of the House of Representatives to retain recklessness as adequate for proof of scienter. Lerach &
Isaacson, supra note 59, at 938-39.
66. Miest, supra note 12, at 1113.
67. Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 59, at 940-42. The procedural pleading issue was addressed by
the House as well. However there was far less controversy on the House floor regarding the pleading
requirement than there was on the Senate floor. Id. The SEC, however, did object to the House version of
the pleading requirement as well, noting that it felt that it would be "beneficial" to resolve the split between
the circuits regarding the pleading requirement by enacting a pleading requirement no more stringent than
that of the Second Circuit. Id. at 938.
68. Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 59, at 944.
69.
See S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995). The text of the bill that came out of the Senate Banking
Committee was as follows:
SEC. 36. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
a. MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS. In any private action arising under
this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant:
1. made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
2. omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; the complaint shall specify
each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is formed.
b. REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.-In any private action arising under this title in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular
state of mind, the plaintiff's complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to
violate this title, specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.
Id.

479

strong inference standard.7 ° However, because the report accompanying the
Senate Banking Committee's version of the bill demonstrated that the "strong
inference of scienter" language was indeed modeled after the Second Circuit
standard, 7' both the White House72 and the SEC 73 voiced approval for the Senate
Banking Committee's version of the bill. 71
The Senate sought to make its adoption of the Second Circuit Standard more
explicit by its adoption of the Specter Amendment.75 During the Senate debate
on S. 240, Senator Arlen Specter introduced an amendment proposing to fully
adopt the Second Circuit test and case law into the proposed bill.76 The
amendment was passed by the full Senate by a vote of 57 to 42, 7and it seemed
that the Senate felt it had resolved the question of the level of specificity needed
to allege scienter once and for all in its final version of the bill. 71

70. SeeS. REP. No. 104-98, at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,694. The Senate Banking
Committee stated:
[T]he Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate
additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the
Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of
defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of law
instructive.
Id.
71.
Id.; see also Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 59, at 944.
72. See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of
Administration Policy on S. 240-Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (June 23, 1995). The
White House announced that "S. 240 is now a substantial improvement on H.R. 1058, which the
Administration could not support.... [S. 240] adopts several sensible provisions, including a workable
pleading standard taken from the Second Circuit." Id.
73. The SEC statement indicated that "[t]he Commission supports, or does not oppose, the measures
set forth in Section 104, 'Requirements for Securities Fraud Actions." Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 59,
at 944 n.283, quoted in SEC Response to OMB Request for Views of the Securities And Exchange
Commission Regarding S. 240, "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" 1 (June 21, 1995).
74.
See id. at 944.
75. Miest, supra note 12, at 1114.
76. 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). The proposed text read as follows:
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind may be established
eitherA. by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit
fraud; or
B. by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness by the defendant.
Id. The text of this proposed amendment was based on the language of the Second Circuit case Beck v.
Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987). See Miest, supra note 12, at 1114.
77. See 141 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
78. The Senate had adopted an established standard of pleading scienter, as the level adopted in the
Specter amendment codified the pleading requirement already in place in the Second Circuit; thus there can
be little doubt that the Senate believed that this pleading requirement would not require additional
interpretation. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1114; see also Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46,
50 (2d Cir. 1987).
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C. Conference Committee
However, the resolution of the issue was short-lived. Although the general
language of the Senate version of the bill was adopted by the Conference
Committee, the Conference Committee replaced language of the Specter
amendment with the less clear "strong inference" language contained in the
Senate Banking Committee's version of the bill.79 However, the Conference
Committee arguably gave the courts some guidance as to its intent in enacting the
"strong inference" standard in its Statement of Managers.8 ° In this Statement, the
Committee explained that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends to
strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard."'" The Committee also
stated, in reference to Senator Specter's proposed amendment codifying the
Second Circuit test, that the Committee "chose not to include in the pleading82
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness.
However, because no explanation was given as to either the stringency of the
pleading requirements that Congress intended to impose or the reasons for
omitting language concerning motive, opportunity, and recklessness, courts have
been left to wonder about the intent of the Committee in removing the Specter
Amendment. 83
D. PresidentialVeto and Subsequent Override
A statement made by President Clinton in vetoing the bill and Congress'
subsequent override of the President's veto added further confusion to the
interpretation of this PSLRA section.~" The President noted an objection to the
language of the Statement of Managers when citing his reasons for vetoing the
bill.8 ' The President indicated both that deletion of the Specter Amendment,
resulting in the omission of the Second Circuit standard from the language of the
PSLRA, and the language in the Statement of Managers, indicating that the
79. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,740.
80. See id.
81.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 41 n.23.
83.
Miest, suprq note 12, at 1115. The omission of the Specter amendment has subsequently been
interpreted as both a complete rejection of the legal doctrines encompassed in the Second Circuit standard
and as a mere unwillingness to codify the language and case law as interpreted and applied by the Second
Circuit. Id. at 1115-20.
84. See President's Message to the House ofRepresentatives Returning Without Approval the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995).
85.
Id.

Committee wished to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirement, led the
President to believe that the intent of Congress in passing the bill was to create8a6
higher pleading standard than that already in existence in the Second Circuit.
Subsequent to President Clinton's statement regarding the interpretation of
Congress' intent in omitting the Specter Amendment, Congress debated the bill
once more 87 and voted to override the President's veto. 88 The bill, as revised by
the Conference Committee without the Specter Amendment, became law on
December 22, 1995.89

86. Id. at 2211. Further, in his message to the House, President Clinton stated: "I will support a bill
that submits all plaintiffs to the tough pleading standards of the Second Circuit, but I am not prepared to go
beyond that." Id.
87. Although the President interpreted the omission of the Specter Amendment as an intent to raise the
pleading requirement to one more stringent than that of the Second Circuit, the debate in Congress prior to
the override vote indicated that Congress did not intend to raise the pleading requirements above those in
the Second Circuit in its enactment of the PSLRA. See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 59, at 957. Senator
Domenici entered into the Congressional Record his interpretation of the pleading standard adopted in the
PSLRA:
Second [C]ircuit pleading standard becomes the uniform rule.-Same as Senate-passed bill;
Senator Specter's amendment deleted from conference report.
The objective: ...To codify the requirements in the [Second] Circuit. A complaint should
outline the facts supporting the lawsuit ....Under the Conference Agreement, the complaint
must set forth the facts supporting each of the alleged misstatements or omissions and must
include facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of scienter or intent.... This is a codification
of the [Second] Circuit rule.
141 CONG. REc. SI 9151 (daily ed.Dec. 22, 1995); see alsogenerally 141 CONG. REc.H 15218 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1995) (noting various groups that agreed with the President); 141 CONG. REC. S 19050 (daily ed.
Dec. 21, 1995) (noting the difference between the Senate Banking Committee standard and the
administration endorsed standard).
88. The House vote was 319 to 100; the Senate vote was 68-30. John W. Avery, SecuritiesLitigation
Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995,51 Bus. LAW. 335,
353 (1996); see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1115.
89. Avery, supra note 88, at 353; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1115. The final version of the
PSLRA reads as follows:
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions
(1) Misleading statements and omissions. In any private action arising under this chapter
in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant:
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind. In any private action arising under this chapter in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a.particular
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this
chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (a)(9)(b).

[Vol. 28: 471, 2001]

ProperPleading StandardUnder the PSLRA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

E. Legislative History of the Uniform Standards Act of 1998
Adding even more confusion to the array of legislative history surrounding the
enactment of the PSLRA, the legislative history of the Uniform Standards Act of
1998 (hereinafter"Uniform Standards Act") again made reference to Congress'
intent in enacting the PSLRA. ° After several courts found that the PSLRA
eliminated recklessness as an adequate level of scienter to impose liability on a
defendant, the SEC began substantial lobbying to "clarify" Congress' intent in
enacting the PSLRA. 9' In a compromise between the SEC and Congress, the SEC
agreed to support the Uniform Standards Act of the 105th Congress if that
Congress would include language in its legislative history of the Uniform
Standards Act indicating that the 104th Congress did not intend to abolish
recklessness as an adequate level of scienter for imposing liability on civil
defendants when drafting and enacting the PSLRA. 9 However, even the adoption

90. See Smith, supra note 12, at 582-83.
91.
See Jacobson & Martin, supra note 15, at 875.
92. See id.The Uniform Standards Act designates federal courts as the sole venue for securities fraud
class actions so as to deter litigants from filing their cases in state courts to avoid the demands of the
PSLRA. Id. at 890; see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M. Leonetti, and Austin W. Bartlett, The
Substantive Elements In The New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB.L. REV. 412, 412-415 (1999). The
pertinent language of the legislative history seeking to clarify Congress' intent in drafting and enacting the
PSLRA reads:
[I]t is the clear understanding ofthe managers that Congress did not, in adopting the [PSLRA],
intend to alter the standards of liability under the Exchange Act.
The managers understand, however, that certain federal district courts have interpreted the
[PSLRA] as having altered the scienter requirement. In that regard, the managers again
emphasize that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither
the Reform Act nor [the Uniform Standards Act] in any way alters the scienter standard in
federal securities fraud suits.
Additionally, it was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated during the legislative
debate on the Reform Act, and particularly during the debate on overriding the President's veto,
that the Reform Act establish a heightened uniform federal standard on pleading requirements
based upon the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, the
express language of the Reform Act itself carefully provides that plaintiffs must "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind." The managers emphasize that neither the Reform Act nor [the Uniform
Standards Act] makes any attempt to define that state of mind.
The managers note that in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether conduct that was not intentional was sufficient for
liability under the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has never answered that question.
The Court expressly reserved the question of whether reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in a subsequent case, Herman & Maclean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), where it stated, "We have explicitly left open the question
of whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement."
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, Joint Explanatory Statement, at 15 (Oct. 9, 1998).

of this language did not fully clarify intent of Congress in enacting the PSLRA.93
First, members of 105th Congress were far from unanimous in their interpretations
of the PSLRA; there was debate on both the House and Senate floor concerning
whether or not the PSLRA actually codified the Second Circuit standard.'
Additionally, because the Supreme Court has held that "the interpretation given
by one ... Congress to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the
meaning of that statute," courts must only use this legislative history as persuasive
evidence of Congress' intent rather than actual evidence of that intent.95
Therefore, rather than clarifying Congress' intent in enacting the PSLRA, the
legislative history accompanying the Uniform Standards Act did no more than
give the courts another piece of history to interpret and, inevitably, upon which to
disagree.9 6
IV. FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PSLRA
As a result of the ambiguous language and legislative history of the PSLRA,
federal courts have applied varying interpretations of the PSLRA.97 The courts
have basically formulated three different interpretations of the pleading
requirement promulgated by the PSLRA: 98 that the PSLRA is a de facto
codification of Second Circuit case law; 99 that the PSLRA did not raise the
standard of scienter above that of recklessness but did raise the level of specificity
needed to plead scienter beyond that developed in Second Circuit case law;is° and
that the PSLRA raised both the. standard of scienter and the standard of pleading
scienter beyond those promulgated by Second Circuit case law. '0' A discussion
of the three interpretations and the rationale behind them is essential to a full
understanding of the impact of the PSLRA. '02
A.

De Facto Codification of Second Circuit Case Law
1. Substantive Requirement of Scienter

Many of the district courts' initial interpretations of the PSLRA found that
the Act merely codified the test already in place in the Second Circuit prior to the
93. Jacobson & Martin, supra note 15, at 878; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 606-07.
94.
1844 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2 (Nov. 11, 1998).
95. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1993).
96. See 1844 Federal Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2 (Nov. 11, 1998); see also Smith, supra note 12, at 606;
In re Advanta, 180 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 1999).
97. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1116.
98. Smith, supra note 12, at 578-79; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1116.
99. See infra notes 103-136 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 137-184 and accompanying text.
101.
See infra notes 185-252 and accompanying text.
102. See Smith, supra note 12, at 579.
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enactment of the PSLRA. 103Thus, these courts held that recklessness remained
04
an adequate level of scienter for pleading securities fraud under the PSLRA.'
District courts advancing this argument did so on four major grounds. 105
The first ground advanced by courts for the determination that recklessness
remained sufficient for pleading scienter was that, because recklessness was so
widely accepted as an adequate level of scienter in the circuit courts prior to the
enactment of the PSLRA, absent a direct legislative decree, the standard should
remain unchanged subsequent to the enactment of the PSLRA. '06
Another ground advanced by such courts was that Congress' stated intention
to raise the procedural pleading requirements for scienter did not automatically
translate into an implicit intention to raise the substantive requirement of scienter
needed to impose liability upon a defendant for securities fraud. '07
A third ground commonly advanced by district courts was that, while in
some sections of the PSLRA Congress explicitly raised the scienter requirement
to one of "actual knowledge," Congress failed to do so in Section 10(b) of the
PSLRA1 °5 Thus, these courts found that Congress' failure to explicitly raise the
scienter requirement exhibited a lack of intent by Congress to do so. o
A final argument advanced by these courts for their determination that
recklessness remained sufficient to plead scienter under the PSLRA was that,
despite the fact that the plain language and the legislative history of the PSLRA
are somewhat ambiguous, legislative silence "does not give the Court grounds to
conclude that recklessness is no longer an adequate basis to establish scienter." "0
103.
Id. at 588; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1117-19; see also generally Rehm v. Eagle Fin.
Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill.

1997); Zeid v. Kimberly, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997), vacated, 201 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 1999);
Marksman Partners L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996); In re Health Mgmt.
Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
104. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1309 (quoting In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50F.3d615,626 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that recklessness can constitute scienter under Rule 1Ob-5 if the recklessness "involves
not merely simple or inexcusable negligence, but an 'extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care
... which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it')); see also Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.
at 201 (holding that "reckless is sufficient to plead a strong inference of fraudulent intent under the
PSLRA"); Fugman, 691 F. Supp. at 1195 (holding that a plaintiff's complaint must provide sufficient facts
to create a "strong inference" of knowledge or recklessness regarding a statement's falsity); Rehm, 954 F.
Supp. at 1252 (holding that the PSLRA adopted the Second Circuit pleading standard, thereby making a
showing of recklessness adequate in establishing scienter, but did not adopt the Second Circuit case law
interpreting this standard).
105.
Smith, supra note 12, at 589; see also Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1309.
106. Smith, supra note 12, at 589.
107. Id.; see also Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1309.
108.

Id.

109.

See id.

110.

Id.

Thus, this first group of district courts concluded that the PSLRA did not
eliminate recklessness as a means of establishing scienter in securities fraud
actions. "'
2. Procedural Requirement of Establishing Scienter
In addition to finding that recklessness survives as an adequate level of
scienter for securities fraud actions, the district courts that first held that the
PSLRA was a de facto codification of the Second Circuit standard found that
plaintiffs could make an adequate showing of scienter to survive a motion to
dismiss by alleging facts demonstrating either (1) motive and opportunity to
commit fraud;"12 or (2) circumstantial evidence showing recklessness in making
questionable statements." 3 The district courts making the determination that the
PSLRA codified the Second Circuit standard reasoned that the plain language of
the PSLRA alone must be used to determine the intent of Congress in drafting and
enacting the statute. "4 The District Court for the Central District of California,
in Marksman PartnersL.P. v. Chantal PharmaceuticalCorp. was one such
district court. "' The Marksman court held that the motive and opportunity test
survived the passage and enactment of the PSLRA."1 6 The court reasoned that the
motive and opportunity test did not conflict in any way with Congress' stated
intention to strengthen the pleading requirements because, prior to the passage of
the PSLRA, the motive and opportunity test was part of the most stringent
pleading requirement among those used throughout the federal circuits." 7
Further, the court reasoned that the motive and opportunity test was consistent
with Congress' intent to require plaintiffs to show a "strong inference" of fraud,
because application of the motive and opportunity test prior to the enactment of
the PSLRA required that "plaintiff's [sic] allegations.., yield a 'strong' inference
of fraudulent intent... .""lsThe court also noted that it was highly suggestive of
Congress' intent to adopt the Second Circuit's test when Congress used the
111. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 588-90.
112.
The motive and opportunity test requires a showing that the defendants had a motive and the
opportunity to commit fraud. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1310. The Second Circuit defines motive as
"concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures
alleged," and opportunity as "the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means
alleged." Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
113. See e.g., Marksman, 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
114. Smith, supra note 12, at 589.
115. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
116. Id. at 1311-12. Although the court in Marksman failed to make an explicit finding as to whether
the "circumstantial evidence of recklessness" prong of the Second Circuit test survived the enactment ofthe
PSLRA, subsequent courts explaining the Marksman holding have found that the holding did conclude that
the "circumstantial evidence of recklessness" prong survived the enactment of the PSLRA. Zeid, 973 F.
Supp. at 917, vacated 201 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the Marksman court "applied the
Second Circuit's two-prong inquiry allowing allegations of either 'motive and an opportunity' or 'conscious
behavior or recklessness' in its analysis of the case").
117. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1310.
118. Jd. at 1311.
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language "strong inference," language already used by the Second Circuit in the
application of its test, to describe the heightened scienter pleading standard." 9
Finally, the court noted that Congress did not expressly reject the motive and
opportunity test anywhere in the language of the PSLRA or in the legislative
history of the statute, and the court recognized that absent an express abrogation
of the prior test, courts should not assume an implicit intent on the part of
Congress to abrogate it. z° Thus, the court in Marksman found that the PSLRA
was a de facto codification of the Second Circuit pleading standard. 121
3. The Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits
Respond to the Second Circuit Standard
Recently, the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits adopted the view of many
district courts when they held that the PSLRA was a de facto codification of the
Second Circuit pleading standard. 22 The Second and Fifth Circuits both
concluded that the PSLRA was a codification of the Second Circuit standard
without analysis. 2 3 However, the Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Corp.Securities
Litigation, presented an extensive argument for its adoption of the Second Circuit
pleading standard.' 24
After dismissing the complicated and conflicting legislative history of the
PSLRA,15 the Advanta court turned to the plain language of the statute. 26 Noting
that the language used in the PSLRA mirrors the language used by the Second
Circuit in employing its pleading standard,' 27 the Advanta court concluded that the
PSLRA established a pleading standard with a pleading requirement similar to
that of the Second Circuit standard. 2 The court also recognized that Congress'
adoption of the Second Circuit pleading standard was consistent with Congress'

119. Id. at 1310.
120. Id. at 1311-12.
121.
Id. at 1312.
122. Walker & Seymour, supra note 12, at 1024 n. 124.
123. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d at 537-38 (interpreting the PSLRA standard is the
same as the Second Circuit standard and applying this standard in a non-demanding manner); see also
Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d at 177-78.
124. See Advanta, 180 F.3d 525, 530-35 (3d Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 533. TheAdvanta court maintained that "there [was] little to gain in attempting to reconcile
the conflicting expressions of legislative intent," and therefore the court "direct[ed] [its] attention to the
Reform Act's plain language, .. .the customary starting point in statutory interpretation." Id.; see also
supra notes 58-96 and accompanying text.
126. Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533.
127. See id. at 534. The court noted that both the plain language ofthe PSLRA and the Second Circuit
test require that plaintiffs allege facts supporting a "strong inference of scienter." Id.
128. Id.

intent to create heightened pleading requirements for securities actions.12 9 The
court reasoned that, because the Second Circuit standard was historically the most

stringent standard prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the adoption of the
Second Circuit standard would effectively heighten the pleading requirements in
many jurisdictions. 30 The court further reasoned that the PSLRA's additional
requirement that plaintiffs plead facts demonstrating scienter "with particularity"
would serve to heighten the standard even in circuits already employing the

Second Circuit standard. 13
The court in Advanta also noted that even though the PSLRA created a
heightened procedural pleading requirement, it did not in any way alter the
substantive requirement of scienter. 132 The court concluded that nowhere in the
plain language or legislative history of the PSLRA did Congress show intent to
eliminate recklessness as an adequate state of mind to impose liability on a
defendant for securities fraud. 3 3 In fact, the court acknowledged that the
retention of the recklessness standard of scienter serves the policy objective of
"discouraging deliberate ignorance and preventing defendants from escaping
liability solely because of the difficulty of proving conscious intent to commit
fraud." 34 Thus, the Advanta court interpreted the PSLRA as a de facto codification of the Second Circuit standard and held that the PSLRA both codified the
procedural requirements of the Second Circuit for pleading scienter and retained
recklessness' 35 as an adequate level of scienter for imposing liability in securities

actions. 136

129. Id. at 534.
130. Id.
131.
Id. at 534.
132. Id.
133.
Id.
134. Id. The court also noted that the elimination of recklessness as an adequate level of scienter would
thwart the purpose of the procedural language of the PSLRA, allowing a showing of facts constituting
circumstantial evidence of recklessness or intent to satisfy the pleading requirement. Id. The court also
noted that the language used by the managers in the conference committee report on the PSLRA, stating that
Congress did not intend to codify the case law of the Second Circuit (referring to the deletion of the Specter
Amendment from the final version of the bill), and "for this reason, the Conference Report chose not to
include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness," was not
dispositive of an intent to eliminate recklessness as an adequate level of scienter or as a means to plead
scienter in securities fraud actions. Id. The court explained that, if Congress intended to eliminate
recklessness as a means for pleading scienter, it could have done so explicitly in the statute. Id. Thus, the
Advanta court reasoned that this language is suggestive of a Congressional intent to leave the matter open
for judicial interpretation. Id.
135.
The Advanta court adopted the definition of recklessness devised by the Seventh Circuit in
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977). Id.
136. Id.
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B. The PSLRA as Containingmore Stringent PleadingRequirements but
a SimilarScienter Requirement
1. Substantive Requirement of Scienter
Subsequent to the enactment of the PSLRA, a second group of courts
interpreting the statute found that even though the PSLRA raised the pleading
requirement beyond the Second Circuit standard, the statute did not eliminate
recklessness as an adequate level of scienter in securities fraud actions. 37 In
interpreting the substantive element of the pleading requirement, these courts
applied the same reasoning as the courts that interpreted the PSLRA as a de facto
codification of the Second Circuit standard. 3 For example, the Southern District
of New York, in In re Baesa SecuritiesLitigation,139 agreed with courts such as
Marksman by holding that the PSLRA did not overrule the uniform conclusion of
the circuit courts finding recklessness to be an adequate state of mind to impose
liability upon a defendant for securities fraud.' 4 However, the court in Baesa
expanded on the Marksmancourt by interpreting recklessness to be a'lesser form
of intent" rather than a "greater degree of negligence" and by finding that courts
do not disturb the intent standard mandated by Hochfelder by allowing acts of
recklessness to be sufficient to impose liability upon a defendant for securities
fraud.' 4' The Baesa court also reiterated that nothing in the plain language of the
PSLRA purported to overrule the uniform holding of the circuit courts that a
showing of recklessness satisfied the scienter requirement in the averment of
securities fraud. 142 Therefore, the court reasoned that, because the plain language
of the statutory text is unambiguous regarding Congress' intent, resort to the
legislative history of the PSLRA is unnecessary. 143 Thus, courts such as Baesa
held that the substantive requirement of pleading securities fraud remained
unchanged following the enactment of the PSLRA. '44

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Miest, supra note 12, at 1120; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 593.
See id. at 593-95.
969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 241; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 594.
Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 24 1.
See id.
Id.
See id.

2. Procedural Requirement of Establishing Scienter
Although courts such as Baesa found that the substantive requirement
remained unchanged by the PSLRA, district courts following the Baesa line of
reasoning did not find that the procedural requirement remained unchanged as
well.1 45 Courts coming to this conclusion looked to the plain language of the
PSLRA, requiring a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind," and
concluded that while Congress expressly adopted the "strong inference" standard,
it did not adopt the motive and opportunity standard as historically used by the
Second Circuit.4 6 Thus, because Congress did not expressly adopt the Second
Circuit standard in the plain language of the statute, these courts determined that
Congress did not intend that a showing of motive and opportunity would
automatically raise a "strong inference" of scienter. 147
However, courts such as Baesa that followed this reasoning left open the
possibility that facts showing motive and opportunity may be relevant and useful
in establishing a "strong inference" of scienter.148 Interestingly, the court in Baesa
did not even eliminate the possibility that a strong showing of motive and
opportunity could, by itself, establish a "strong inference" of scienter sufficient
to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement. 4 9 At the same time, Baesa, like
other courts holding that the PSLRA is not a de facto codification of the Second
Circuit pleading requirement, recognized that the facts giving rise to a "strong
inference" of scienter, whatever they may be, must be pled with particularity." 0
Thus, if motive and opportunity were to give rise to a "strong inference" of
scienter, motive and opportunity would have to be pled with particularity-as
required by the plain language of the PSLRA. ''
Other district courts followed the basic reasoning of Baesa and found that this
reasoning was consistent with the legislative history of the PSLRA, as well as its
plain language. 5 2 The court in Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche,
L.L.P. 153 found that the Baesa approach was consistent with the intent exhibited
by Congress in the Conference Committee Report to the PSLRA and the Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference Regarding S. 1260.' 4
The court in Carley CapitalGroup also noted that the legislative history of the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Smith, supra note 12, at 594.
Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1120.
Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 594.
Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 595.
Smith, supra note 12, at 595.
27 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
Id. at 1338.
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Uniform Standards Act did not establish that the Second Circuit pleading standard
was either adopted or refuted by the PSLRA.'55 Thus, subsequent courts found
that the Baesa interpretation of the PSLRA's procedural requirement, while based
solely on the plain language
of the statute, was also consistent with the legislative
56
history of the PSLRA.
3. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits: more Stringent Pleading Require-

ments but a Similar Scienter Requirement
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit handed down its decision in Bryant v. Avado
Brands,Inc., 57 in which it held that while the PSLRA did not alter the substantive
standard that was in place prior to its enactment, it did alter the procedural
pleading standard to one above any standard in place prior to its enactment.158
Bryant was the second federal circuit court decision to interpret the PSLRA as
adopting the pre-PSLRA substantive standard of recklessness while rejecting the
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test. 159
The court in Bryant first concluded that recklessness survived as an adequate
level of scienter to impose liability for securities fraud after the adoption of the
PSLRA.' 0 In doing so, the Bryant court adopted the reasoning of many district
courts.16 ' Bryant, like Baesa,16 2 acknowledged that it is unnecessary, and even

improper, to look to the legislative history for guidance when the plain language
of the statute is unambiguous as to the drafters' intent.'63 Therefore, the court
relied on the plain language of the statute in making its determination as to the
sufficiency of recklessness in proving state of mind.'1 Bryant reasoned that the
155. See id. at 1338-39. The interpretation given to a statute by a subsequent Congress is of little
assistance in determining the intent of the Congress that enacted the statute. See Cent. Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1994).
156. See Carley Capital Group, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1338; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 595.
157.
187 F.3d 1271 (llth Cir. 1999).
158. See id. at 1286-87.
159. See id. The Sixth Circuit has also held that the PSLRA did not change the substantive law as to
what constitutes scienter and did not change the Sixth Circuit's pre-PSLRA holding that motive and
opportunity are not the equivalent of intent and therefore cannot create a strong inference of scienter. See
In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 548-54 (6th Cir. 1999). The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have
held that the PSLRA was a de facto codification of the Second Circuit pleading standard. See supra notes
122-136 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has held that the PSLRA eliminated mere reckless as
a standard for liability and the motive and opportunity test as a means for pleading scienter. See infra notes
216-252 and accompanying text.
160. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
161.
See e.g. Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310-12 (C.D.
Ca. 1996); see also Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241.
162. See id.
163. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283.
164. Id. at 1284.

plain language of the statute was unambiguous as to the required state of mind
because the plain language of the PSLRA failed to require "actual knowledge" as
the standard for scienter.' 65 The court in Bryant also reasoned that, because
Congress was aware that the federal circuits had uniformly found recklessness to
be sufficient to show that the defendant possessed the "required state of mind" in
securities fraud actions, if Congress had intended to alter the scienter requirement,
it would not have referred to the "required state of mind" 66 in the plain language
of the statute.167 Thus, Bryant found that recklessness survived as an adequate
level of scienter under the PSLRA. 161
However, Bryant did not find that the motive and opportunity test developed
by the Second Circuit survived the enactment of the PSLRA.' 69 The court came
to this conclusion after closely scrutinizing of the language of the statute. 70
Bryant notes that the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to "'state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind."""' The "required state of mind" in the Eleventh Circuit is, at a
minimum, severe recklessness.' 72 The Bryant court then reasoned that because
"required state of mind" is clearly a substantive standard, motive and opportunity,
a procedural standard, can never suffice to plead "state of mind," or scienter.'13
The court concluded that motive and opportunity is merely a specific kind of
evidence that can be utilized to plead the "required state of mind." 174 Thus, while
facts pleading motive and opportunity can serve as evidence to show that the
defendant possessed the "required state of mind," motive and opportunity cannot
alone serve as an adequate basis for establishing state of mind. 175
The Bryant court also reasoned that because the motive and opportunity test
was not well established throughout the circuits, this test could not have been
codified sub silento by the legislature. 7 6 While the recklessness standard was
uniform throughout the federal circuits, the motive and opportunity test was

165.
Id. Another section in the PSLRA, the safe harbor provision, explicitly provides that the safe
harbor provision applies only to statements that the defendant made with less than "actual knowledge" of
their falsity or misleading nature. See 15 U.S.C. s. 78u-5(c)(l)(B).
166. "Required state of mind" had been defined in the circuits as intent or recklessness. Bryant, 187
F.3d at 1284.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1285.
170. See id.
171.
Id.
172. See id. (quoting Carley Capital Group, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1339).
173. Id. at 1285-86.
174. Id.
175, See id. This is distinguishable from the reasoning in Baesa, where the court reasoned in dicta that
it may be possible for motive and opportunity alone to serve as adequate evidence of scienter. See Baesa,
969 F. Supp. at 242; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
176. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
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employed only by two circuits. 7 7 Therefore, while the Bryant court was willing
to interpret the absence of language defining the "required state of mind" as
adopting the uniform requirement of recklessness, it was not willing to interpret
the absence of language adopting the motive and opportunity test as adopting the
"lesser-known, lesser-accepted, and certainly not well-established notion that
allegations of motive and opportunity to commit fraud are sufficient to show
scienter." 7 Thus, the Bryant court rejects the motive and opportunity test based
on the court's reading of the plain language of the PSLRA. 179
In addition to its argument rejecting the motive and opportunity test based
upon the plain language of the PSLRA, Bryant also offered a policy argument for
rejecting the motive and opportunity test of the Second Circuit. 80 Adopting the
rationale of Judge Thrash in Carley Capital Group,'' the court argued that the
motive and opportunity standard may in fact lower the standard of pleading
scienter for securities cases below the level required by the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder.'82 The court argued that because the motive and opportunity standard
would serve to lessen the pleading requirements rather than heighten them, this
standard would not serve to adequately curb securities litigation abuse-a primary
goal of Congress in drafting and enacting the PSLRA." 3 Thus, the Bryant court
held that the plain language of the statute compels the retention of the recklessness standard, and that both the plain language of the statute and underlying
policy concerns compel the rejection of the Second Circuit's motive and
opportunity test. 184

177. See id. Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, only the Second and Ninth Circuits had employed
the motive and opportunity standard for pleading scienter. See id.
178.

Id.

179.
180.

Id. at 1286-87.
See id. at 1286.

181.

Id. Judge Thrash stated:

The Eleventh Circuit has never adopted a scienter standard that follows the "motive and
opportunity" analysis of the Second Circuit. A good argument can be made that the "motive
and opportunity" standard lowers the bar for securities fraud cases below that mandated by the
Supreme Court in Hochfelder. Greed is a ubiquitous motive, and corporate insiders and upper
management always have opportunity to lie and manipulate. Furthermore, allowing private
securities class actions to proceed to discovery upon bare allegations of motive and opportunity
would upset the delicate balance of providing a remedy for genuine fraud while preventing
abusive strike suits that the Reform Act sought to achieve. Motive and opportunity will
ordinarily be relevant, and often highly relevant... [but] a showing of motive and opportunity
standing alone [is] insufficient to allege securities fraudunder the "severe recklessness" standard
established by the Eleventh Circuit.
Id. (quoting Carley Capital Group, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1339).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1286-87.

C. The PSLRA: more Stringent Scienter and PleadingRequirements than
the Second Circuit
1. Substantive Requirement for Scienter
Still a third group of courts has held that the enactment of the PSLRA
heightened both the substantive and procedural requirements for pleading
securities fraud. 185 These courts have held that a showing of simple recklessness,

as opposed to deliberate recklessness, is no longer adequate to establish scienter
in securities fraud cases.' 86 Courts making this determination have reasoned that
Congress' stated intent to both strengthen the pleading requirements that existed
prior to the enactment of the PSLRA and eliminate frivolous litigation indicates
that Congress meant to eliminate liability for simple recklessness. 87
One of the first district courts to make this ruling was the Northern District
of California in In re Silicon Graphics.' The court in In re Silicon Graphicsheld
that "[a] plaintiff must allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial evidence
of conscious behavior by defendants."' 8 9 The court looked to the legislative
history of the PSLRA in determining that Congress intended to heighten the
scienter requirement in securities fraud actions to one above that in place prior to
the enactment of the PSLRA.'90 The court argued that Congress showed a definite
intent to strengthen both substantive and procedural pleading requirements in

securities fraud cases by its omission of the Second Circuit's language regarding
motive, opportunity, and recklessness, its rejection of the Specter Amendment, its
Conference Committee statement indicating that the Committee intended to
"strengthen existing pleading requirements," and its override of President
Clinton's veto.' 9' Thus, the court concluded that a reading of the legislative

history of the PSLRA shows that Congress intended to raise both the substantive
and procedural pleading standard beyond that of the Second Circuit when
185.
See Miest, supra note 12, at 1116-17; see also Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 917 F. Supp. 363,
373-74 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the PSLRA eliminates both recklessness and the motive and
opportunity standard as adequate evidence of scienter for imposing liability for securities fraud); Norwood
Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205,208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (accord); Friedberg v. Discreet
Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42,45-50 (D. Mass. 1997).
186. See Smith, supra note 12, at 590-99; see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1116-17 (explaining the
heightened pleading and liability standards of section 21 D(8)(2)); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.,
183 F.3d 970, 974-75 (noting that the PSLRA's purpose is best served by the "deliberate recklessness"
standard). ,
187. Miest, supra note 12, at 1117.
188. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
189. Id. at *6.
190. Id. at *5.The district court inInre Silicon Graphics did not distinguish between the substantive
and procedural pleading requirements under the PSLRA, and therefore its analysis of the substantive
pleading requirement is based largely on congressional language relating to the procedural pleading
requirements. Miest, supra note 12, at 1117.
191.
Inre Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5-6.
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92

enacting the PSLRA. 1
The plaintiffs in In re Silicon Graphicspresented two arguments previously

accepted by other federal courts when arguing that simple recklessness remained
an adequate state of mind to impose liability subsequent to the enactment of the
PSLRA.' 93 The district court dispensed with both arguments." 4 The plaintiffs
first argued that several legislators made statements in the course of debating the
bill indicating that they felt that the bill was adopting the Second Circuit pleading
standard.' 95 The court attacked this argument by contending that the statements
cited by the plaintiffs were made by only a few members of Congress prior to the
President's veto message and the veto's subsequent override.' 96 The court further
argued that it is proper to look at a committee report as a whole, rather than at the
comments of individual legislators, when determining Congress' intent in
enacting a bill. 197
The plaintiffs also argued that because section 210(g)(2)(A) made a
distinction between "knowing and non-knowing" violators, liability for recklessness was possible under the PSLRA.' 98 The plaintiffs argued that, while section
2 10(g)(2)(A) explicitly states that non-knowing persons could not be found liable
for securities fraud violations, section 78u-4 does not make a distinction between
knowing and non-knowing persons, and, therefore, both may be found liable.'99
The court rejected this argument as well. 200 Arguing that it is necessary to
consider policy objectives when interpreting congressional intent, the court
pointed out that it was because Congress sought to protect those associated with
the capital markets from abusive securities litigation that it enacted heightened

pleading requirements in the PSLRA.

°t

Thus, in order to curb the number of

frivolous suits, Congress intended to raise the scienter requirement beyond that
192. Id.
193. See id. at *6-7. In fact, the arguments cited to by the plaintiffs were previously advanced in and
accepted by other federal district courts within the Ninth Circuit. See e.g., Marksman Partners L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310-13 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Zeid v. Kimberly, 973 F. Supp. 910,
91618 (N.D. Cal. 1997), vacated by, 201 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 1999).
194. In re Silicon Graphics,1996 WL 664639, at *6-7.
195. Id. Examples of these statements included those made by Representative Bliley, 141 CONG. REC.
H14,040 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) and Senator Moseley-Braun, 141 CONG. REc. S17,983 (daily ed. Dec.
5, 1995).
196. In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *6.
197. Id. But see In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning,
J., concurring and dissenting) (remarking that by looking at the legislative history of the PSLRAas a whole,
the proper conclusion to be drawn is that Congress adopted simple recklessness as an adequate state of mind
for the imposition of liability under the PSLRA).
198. In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *7.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201.
Id.

of simple recklessness.2" 2 Therefore, the district court in In re Silicon Graphics
held that a showing of simple recklessness was not sufficient to make an adequate
showing of scienter subsequent to the enactment of the PSLRA. 203
2. Procedural Requirement of Establishing Scienter
Courts holding that the PSLRA rejects recklessness as adequate to impose
liability upon a defendant for securities fraud also reject the motive and
opportunity test as a means for establishing scienter.2° Courts rejecting the
motive and opportunity test argue that the legislative history of the PSLRA shows
the clear intent of Congress to raise the pleading requirements for securities fraud
actions and, thus, to adopt a pleading standard higher than that of the Second
Circuit. 20 5 The In Re Silicon Graphics court advanced this same argument for
eliminating the motive and opportunity test-that Congress' stated intent to
strengthen existing pleading requirements and to curb frivolous litigation required
the rejection of the motive and opportunity test. 2 6 Thus, the In re Silicon
Graphics court held that in order to satisfy the pleading requirement of the
PSLRA, plaintiffs had to allege facts that created a "strong inference" that the
defendant possessed the required state of mind. 207
Other district courts have advanced arguments specifically directed toward
2 08
the rejection of the procedural pleading requirement of motive and opportunity.
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, in Friedberg
v. DiscreetLogic Inc.,2" held that the PSLRA rejected the motive and opportunity
standard of the Second Circuit while retaining the Second Circuit's circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior standard.2"0 The court reasoned that Congress
failed to codify the Second Circuit's case law regarding the pleading of motive,
opportunity, and recklessness "because these approaches ... were not sufficiently
stringent."2 . However, the court did accept the circumstantial evidence of

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Voit v.Wonderwave Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363,373-77 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the PSLRA
eliminates both recklessness and the motive and opportunity standards as adequate evidence of scienter for
imposing liability for securities fraud); Norwood Venture Corp. v.Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205,208-09
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (accord); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 45-50 (D. Mass. 1997)
(accord).
205. See In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5-6; see also Friedberg,959 F. Supp. at 4850.
206. In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5-6; see also Miest supra note 12, at 1117 (noting
that the In re Silicon Graphics court "did not distinguish between the substantive concept of scienter and
the procedural pleading tests").
207. In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *7.
208. See, e.g., Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 48-50.
209. 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997).
210. Id. at 49.
211.
Id.
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conscious behavior standard, 1 2 finding it more stringent, because under this
standard plaintiffs had to support their allegations with 'strong' circumstantial
evidence. 1 3 Thus, courts such as Friedberg and In re Silicon Graphics have
found that the PSLRA eliminated both liability for recklessness and the motive
and opportunity standard for pleading scienter. 214

3. The Ninth Circuit: The PSLRA has Heightened both the Substantive
and Procedural Requirements for Pleading Securities Fraud.
The plaintiffs in In re Silicon Graphicsappealed the district court's dismissal
of their claim to the Ninth Circuit. 215 The opinion handed down in this case has
been very controversial, as its holding is contrary to that of other circuit courts
which have considered the interpretation of the pleading requirements of the
PSLRA, and is likely to spawn debate until Congress or the Supreme Court
attempts to again create uniformity among the circuits.2 6 Therefore, the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions of the In re Silicon Graphicsdecision will be
discussed in detail in the remainder of this Comment, along with the likely effect
that these opinions will have on the federal courts, private plaintiffs, and the
capital markets.

a. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in In re Silicon Graphicsis structured in a manner that
effectively underscores the court's intent to clarify the standard of pleading
212.
Id. The court noted that there is a distinction between conscious behavior and recklessness. Id.
at 49 n.2. This distinction was blurred in the Second Circuit as both were allowed under the prior pleading
standard. See id. However, because the court held that the PSLRA eliminated liability for recklessness,
conscious behavior can now only refer to "intent to defraud [or] knowledge of the falsity [ofa statement]."
Id.
213.
Id.at 49.
214.
Id.; see also In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5-7.
215.
See In re Silicon GraphicsInc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970
(9th Cir. 1999), reh 'g denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
216.
See InreComshareInc., 183 F.3d 542,550 (6thCir. 1999) (holding that a "plaintiffmay survive
a motion to dismiss by pleading facts that give rise to a 'strong inference' of recklessness"); see also In re
Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding that it "remains sufficient for plaintiffs [to]
plead [sic] scienter-by alleging facts 'establishing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting
forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior'); Press v. Chem.
Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2nd Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff may either allege facts of
motive and opportunity to commit fraud or facts that "constitute strong circumstantial evidence ofconscious
misbehavior or recklessness") (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp. Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2nd Cir.
1996)); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (1 th Cir. 1999) (holding that recklessness
is an adequate level of scienter for purposes of liability but allegations of motive and opportunity are not
sufficient to establish scienter).

required in the Ninth Circuit. 2 7 The court began by enunciating the proper
standard of pleading under the PSLRA and then applied that standard to the facts
of the case.2" 8 The court first addressed the scienter requirement of the PSLRA,
holding that recklessness, in the Section 10(b) context, is "a form of intentional
conduct," and, therefore, evidence pleading recklessness must give rise to a strong
inference of deliberate recklessness." 9 The court came to this conclusion after
220
recounting the development of the recklessness standard in the Ninth Circuit.
The court first considered its interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Hochfelder.22' The court recalled that in Nelson v. Serwold,222 it
accepted recklessness as sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.223 The court then continued to trace the history of recklessness in the
circuit, noting that, in Hollingerv. Titan CapitalCorp.,224 it adopted the Sunstrand
definition of recklessness.22 5 The court reasoned that both of these cases
demonstrated that the Ninth Circuit viewed recklessness as "intentional or
knowing misconduct" even prior to the enactment of the PSLRA.2 1 6 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit extended
its previous interpretation of recklessness to its interpreta2 27
tion of the PSLRA.
Next, the court turned to its interpretation of the procedural requirements for
pleading securities fraud under the PSLRA. 22' The court noted that the plain
language of the PSLRA does not establish whether motive and opportunity or
circumstantial evidence of simple recklessness suffice to raise a "strong inference"
of deliberate recklessness. 229 Thus, the court turned to the legislative history of
the Act. 230
The court first acknowledged that the most reliable source of legislative
intent, other than the plain language of the statute itself, is the Conference
Report.23' After examining the Conference Report, the court concluded that, by
enacting the PSLRA, Congress intended to raise the pleading standard for

217. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 973-74.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 976-77.
220. Id. at 975-77.
221.
Id. at 975.
222. 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978).
223.
In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976.
224. 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
225.
In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976; see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
(recounting the Sunstrand definition of recklessness).
226. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977.
227. See id. (holding that "recklessness in the § 10(b) context is, in the words of the Supreme Court,
a form of intentional conduct").
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. See id. But see In re Advanta, 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3rd Cir. 1995) (observing that, because the
legislative history is as unhelpful as it is confusing and contradictory, the legistlative history should be
disregarded and interpretation should be liniited to the plain language of the statute).
231.
In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977.
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securities fraud actions in an attempt to curb frivolous securities litigation.232 The
court reasoned that Congress intended to raise the pleading requirement for
securities fraud actions because Congress' purpose in enacting the PSLRA was
to "deter non-meritorious lawsuits by creating procedural barriers such as
heightened pleading standards. 2 33 Thus, the court held that the PSLRA raised
pleading standards to discourage abusive securities litigation. 234
The In re Silicon Graphics court further held that Congress intended to
heighten pleading standards beyond those of the Second Circuit. 235 The court
pointed to three pieces of legislative history in making this determination: the
rejection of the Specter Amendment, the rejection of the Second Circuit's twoprong standard in favor of the more stringent "strong inference" standard, and
President Clinton's veto and Congress' subsequent vote to override his veto.236
Looking first at the rejection of the Specter Amendment, the court concluded that,
had Congress wanted to codify the Second Circuit test, it would not have
discarded the Specter Amendment.237 Instead, the court concluded that Congress
implicitly rejected the Second Circuit's two-pronged standard when it declined
to incorporate the Specter Amendment into the final version of the bill. 23' The
court then focused its analysis on the Conference Committee's express rejection
of the Second Circuit's two-prong standard in favor of the more stringent "strong
inference" standard, citing the following language of the Conference Committee:
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit. . . . Regarded as the most stringent
pleading standard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff
state facts with particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise
to a "strong inference" of the defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the
Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law
interpreting this pleading standard. 239

232.
Id. at 977-78.
233.
Id. at 978. The court cited to the language of the Statement of Managers to argue that Congress
intended to prevent frivolous securities litigation by enacting the PSLRA. Id. at 977-78. Citing to this
language, the court explained that Congress intended to protect investors and the capital markets from losses
caused from frivolous litigation by instituting heightened pleading requirements. Id. at 978.

234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 978-79. For a discussion of President Clinton's veto of the PSLRA, see infra note 246 and

accompanying text.

237.
238.
239.

Id. at 978.
Id.
Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, at 41 n.23) (emphasis omitted).

The court explained that, although Congress incorporated the Second
Circuit's strong inference standard into the PSLRA, it did not incorporate the less
stringent Second Circuit case law that interpreted this standard.' 40 The court also
explained that Congress' adoption f the "strong inference" standard of the
Second Circuit is not indicative of Congressional intent to adopt the underlying
two-prong standard.24 The court was of the view that the "strong inference"
standard was adopted by Congress in drafting the PSLRA "only because it was
facially more stringent than the 'reasonable inference' standard" that was in place
in most jurisdictions at the time the PSLRA was drafted.242 Thus, although
Congress accepted the Second Circuit standard of pleading itself, it expressly
rejected the methods approved by the Second Circuit for meeting this standard.243
The court finally determined that the presidential veto and subsequent
congressional override showed that Congress intended to enact a pleading
standard more stringent than that of the Second Circuit when enacting the
PSLRA. 2" In his message to Congress, President Clinton stated:
I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report with
regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural
hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am
prepared to support the high pleading standards of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any
Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the
Statement of the Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond
that level. I am not prepared to accept that. 245
The court argued that because Congress voted to override the President's veto and
to enact the version of the bill adopted by the Conference Committee, Congress
246
intended to elevate the pleading standard beyond that of the Second Circuit.
Hence, because Congress could have altered the bill to address the concerns
voiced by the President but chose not to do so, the court felt it was evident that
Congress intended to elevate the pleading standard beyond that of the Second
Circuit. 247
Thus, after examining the legislative history, the In re Silicon Graphicscourt
held the pleading standard under the PSLRA to be more stringent than that of the

240. Id. at 978-79.
241.
Id. at 979.
242. Id.
243.
Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1995)).
246. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 269-71.
247. In re Silicon Graphics, 187 F,3d at 979 (noting that "because the joint committee expressly
rejected the 'motive and opportunity' and 'reckless' tests when raising the standard, Congress must have
intended a standard that lies beyond the Second Circuit standard"),
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Second Circuit.24 Therefore, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit making claims under
the PSLRA must plead "particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of
deliberate recklessness ....
.249 The In re Silicon Graphics court concluded that
the "deliberate recklessness" standard adopted by the court properly reconciled
Congress' adoption of the "strong inference" standard with Congress' refusal to
codify the Second Circuit's two-prong "motive and opportunity" and "recklessness" test.250 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphicsadopted the most
stringent interpretation of the PSLRA to date. 25 '

b. Concurringand Dissenting Opinion
Judge Browning dissented to the majority's interpretation of the PSLRA and
its dismissal of Brody's complaint. 252 Judge Browning first addressed the

majority's interpretation of the procedural pleading requirements.253 Judge
Browning took a textualist approach to the statute and concluded that, because the
PSLRA does not mention motive, opportunity, or recklessness, there is no basis
for courts to conclude that proof of motive and opportunity or recklessness are not
sufficient to establish a "strong inference" of deliberate recklessness.2 54 Judge
Browning felt that a plain language reading of the statute was all that was needed
to interpret the statute and admonished the majority for turning to legislative
history in its interpretation.255 Judge Browning then argued that, even if a reading
of the legislative history was necessary for interpretation of the PSLRA, the

248.
Id.
249.
Id.
250.
Id. The court then applied its interpretation of the PSLRA to the facts of In re Silicon Graphics.
Id. at 979-88. In its application, the court determined that the plaintiff, Brody, failed to "state with
particularity" the facts upon which Brody's allegations were made because Brody failed to provide
corroborating details concerning Brody's sources of information for the suspect reports, the author or
authors of the suspect reports, the recipients of the suspect reports, and the contents of the suspect reports.
Id. at 985. The court further reasoned that, without these facts, it was not possible for the court to determine
whether the defendant's level of scienter reached that of deliberate recklessness, and without this showing
the claim had to be dismissed. Id. The court also examined Brody's allegations regarding insider trading
and determined that none of the officers in question had engaged in the type of stock sales that gave rise to
a "strong inference of deliberate recklessness." Id. at 985-88. Thus, the court concluded that the generic
allegations set forth by Brody in this case amounted to no more than the type of "fishing expedition" that
the PSLRA was enacted to deter. Id. at 988.
251.
See id. at 979.
252.
Id. at 991-1003 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
253.
Id. at 991-94 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
254.
Id. at 992 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
255.
Id. at 992-93 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).

majority's interpretation of the relevant legislative history was erroneous.256 In
making this argument, Judge Browning rebuked the majority for its arguments
relating to the rejection of the Specter Amendment, the rejection of the Second
Circuit's two-prong standard in the Conference Committee report, and the
Presidential veto and subsequent Congressional override vote. 257
Judge Browning began by dismissing the majority's argument that the
rejection of the Specter Amendment was an implicit rejection of the Second
Circuit pleading standard.258 Judge Browning pointed out that, while Congress did
reject the Specter Amendment, the legislative history of the PSLRA suggests that
this language was rejected because it was "'an incomplete and inaccurate
codification"' of the Second Circuit case law and not because Congress intended
to reject "motive and opportunity" or "recklessness" as adequate to plead scienter
under the PSLRA.259 Judge Browning further acknowledged that Congress
expressly stated that courts may find the Second Circuit "body of law" instructive,
again giving rise to the interpretation that Congress did not intend to reject the
Second Circuit pleading standard. 2' ° Finally, Judge Browning acknowledged that
an express codification of the Second Circuit case law, allowing recklessness to
suffice for pleading scienter in all cases, including cases involving forwardlooking statements, would be inconsistent with the safe harbor's express
requirement of "actual knowledge" for forward-looking statements. 261 Thus,
Judge Browning reasoned that it was a practical consideration of Congress that
compelled it to reject the Specter Amendment, rather than an express rejection of
the body of law the Specter Amendment incorporated. 262
Judge Browning next addressed the majority's argument that a statement
made in the Conference Report, which indicated that Congress chose not to
include language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness because the
Conference Committee intended to strengthen the pleading requirements in place
prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, showed the express intention of Congress63
2
to enact a more stringent pleading requirement than that of the Second Circuit.
Judge Browning argued that it is more probable that Congress chose not to use
language pertaining to opportunity, motive, or recklessness because Congress
"was concerned only with adopting the Second Circuit's pleading standard, not
with adopting (or rejecting) particular factual patterns that might satisfy that

256. Id. (Browning, J.,concurring and dissenting). Judge Browning argued that legislative history must
be interpreted as a whole, and when considered as a whole the legislative history of the PSLRA does not
reject the Second Circuit pleading standard. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
257. Id. at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
258. Id. at 993 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
259. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S 19067 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 1995) (Sen. Dodd quoting memorandum of Prof. Grundfest)).
260. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
261.
Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
262. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
263.
Id. at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
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standard. ''21 Judge Browning also noted an inconsistency in the majority's
reasoning by pointing out that the majority interpreted an absence of language
concerning motive, opportunity, or recklessness as a rejection of these standards
of pleading, while interpreting an absence of language concerning conscious
misbehavior as an adoption of that standard of pleading. 265 Thus, according to
Judge Browning, it is likely that the absence of language concerning motive,
opportunity, or recklessness was not meant to eliminate them as adequate
standards of pleading. 266
Judge Browning finally addressed the majority's argument that Congress
demonstrated its intent to heighten the pleading requirement when it overrode the
President's veto of the PSLRA.267 Judge Browning argued that the majority's
argument relied on the assumption that Congress agreed with the President's
interpretation that the PSLRA heightened the pleading standard beyond that of the
Second Circuit.2 6' However, Judge Browning noted that during the Senate's
override debate, the sponsors of the bill explicitly disagreed with the President's
interpretation of the bill and stated that the PSLRA's pleading standard was
"faithful to the Second Circuit's test."2 69 Thus, Judge Browning concluded that

the majority's argument regarding the veto override failed to concede that
Congress did not necessarily have to agree with the President's interpretation of
the bill, which resulted in his decision to veto, in order to override his veto. 270
Following his discussion of the shortcomings of the majority's interpretation
of the procedural pleading requirements of the PSLRA, Judge Browning went on
to criticize the majority's holding that the PSLRA altered the substantive
requirement for establishing scienter and eliminated "mere recklessness as a basis
of liability." 271 Judge Browning first recognized that prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA, the circuits had uniformly held that recklessness sufficed to satisfy
section 10(b)'s scienter requirement.272 He further noted that when Congress
intended to eliminate liability for recklessness in other parts of the PSLRA,
Congress did so explicitly.273 Judge Browning then argued that, because Congress
264. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
265. Id. at 994 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
266. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
267. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
268. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
269. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S 19067 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 1995) (Sen. Dodd quoting from memorandum of Prof. Grundfest)).
270. See id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
271.
Id. at 994-95 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
272. Id. at 995 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
273.
Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Browning explained that the standard of
liability for "forward- looking" statements in the "safe harbor" provision of the PSLRA requires plaintiffs
to allege that these "forward looking" statements were made with "actual knowledge" as to their falsity.

was aware of this interpretation and did not explicitly heighten the scienter
requirement, Congress did not intend to eliminate recklessness as a sufficient
level of scienter in cases of securities fraud. 274
Judge Browning further noted that the SEC, the governing agency for
securities fraud actions, often allows for use of the recklessness standard in its
own cases.27 The SEC argues that recklessness is "'essential to the effective
functioning of Section 10(b),' and 'necessary to protect investors and the integrity
of the disclosure process.'- 2 76 Thus, Judge Browning advocated consideration of
SEC standards and policy goals when interpreting the scienter requirement under
the PSLRA.277
Finally, Judge Browning noted that the Senate Report stated that the
Conference Committee was not adopting a "new and untested ... standard that
would generate additional litigation." 27 ' However, Judge Browning explained that
the pleading requirement formulated by the majority was indeed a new pleading
standard, and, because of this novel interpretation, extensive litigation of this
issue is likely in the future.27 9 Judge Browning argued that this new pleading
standard is "a formulation not found in the text of the statute, in the legislative
history, or in any case heretofore litigated, and rejected by the responsible
administrative agency... [and is thus] 'new,' 'untested,' and certain to 'generate
additional litigation."' 280 Thus, upon finding that the PSLRA adopted the Second
Circuit pleading standard, Judge Browning rejected the majority's view that the
PSLRA heightened both the scienter and pleading requirements beyond those in
place in the Second Circuit prior to the enactment of the PSLRA. 281
c. Dissenting Opinionfrom Denial of Rehearing En Banc
Subsequent to the court's ruling on this case, the plaintiffs filed petitions for

Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Browning further explained that the PSLRA imposes
joint and several liability only if the defendant "knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws."
Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-8(g)(l0)(B)). Thus, he concluded
that because the court did not explicitly require that the plaintiff show that the defendant had actual
knowledge and intent, a showing of recklessness is adequate to meet the liability standard. Id. at 995-96
(Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
274. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
275.
Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
276. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amicus SEC at 17, 20).
277. Id. at 995-96 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
278. Id. at 996 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
279. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
280. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
281.
See id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting). In making this finding, Judge Browning
determined that Brody's complaint satisfied the pleading requirement of the PSLRA by providing adequate
detail as to the factual basis giving rise to a strong inference that SGI and its officers knowingly or recklessly
misrepresented the projected success of the company and, as shown by the officer's massive insider trading,
had the motive and opportunity to defraud. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting). Thus, Judge
Browning would not have dismissed Brody's claim. Id. (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting).
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rehearing and rehearing en banc. 82 The Ninth Circuit denied both petitions." 3
Judge Reinhardt, along with Judges Pregerson, Tashima, Hawkins, and Graber,
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that the court made an
erroneous decision when it interpreted the pleading requirement under the
PSLRA.2 4 Judge Reinhardt, writing for the dissent, began by arguing that the

court has a duty to rectify an opinion that "ignores the authority of Congress's
words, the dictates of stare decisis, and the uniform conclusion of other circuit
courts., 215 Judge Reinhardt then acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit is the only
circuit to have "arrive[d] at the remarkable conclusion" that the PSLRA's
pleading requirement eliminated recklessness as an adequate level of scienter to
impose liability on a defendant.286 Judge Reinhardt pointed to the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,287 which was decided after In

re Silicon Graphicsand explicitly rejected the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in
In re Silicon Graphics, to show that rather than setting a trend throughout the
circuits by raising the level of scienter required to impose liability on a defendant,
the Ninth Circuit had instead been "left [out] in the cold."2 8 After questioning the
logic of the court in altering the substantive standard of scienter and in replacing
the old standard of recklessness with an entirely new and untested standard, Judge
by remarking on the newly formed standard of "deliberate
Reinhardt concluded
9
28

recklessness."

For all its ambiguity and peculiarity, however, two things are clear: (1) the
"deliberate recklessness" standard is deliberately designed to make it more
difficult for innocent persons injured by the reckless conduct of the issuers of
securities to obtain recoveries, and (2) the substantive change in the law was made
not by Congress but by a panel of [the Ninth Circuit] that substituted its own
policy views for those of the legislative branch. 290
Thus, even the Ninth Circuit is far from a consensus that the PSLRA
heightened both the substantive and procedural pleading requirements for
securities fraud actions. 291

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 195 F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1999).

Id.
Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 523 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (lth Cir. 1999).
In re Silicon Graphics, 195 F.3d at 523 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id.
See id.

V. THE IMPACT OF IN RE SILICON GRAPHICS
The In re Silicon Graphics decision put the Ninth Circuit in conflict with
every other circuit court in the country by holding that recklessness does not
suffice for liability under the PSLRA.2 92 It also placed the Ninth Circuit in the
midst of a split in the federal circuits as to the proper interpretation of the
pleading requirements under the PSLRA. 293 Because one of the predominant

goals of the PSLRA was to create a uniform pleading standard, it is likely that
either Congress or the Supreme Court will take action seeking to end the
controversy once and for all.294 In the meantime, however, the impact of this case
on pending federal court cases, future plaintiffs, and corporate entities will be
significant.295

A. Impact of In re Silicon Graphics On Pending Cases
While the In re Silicon Graphics case was pending appeal in the Ninth
Circuit, courts all over the country, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, delayed
making decisions on motions to dismiss for securities fraud cases.296 Now that In
re Silicon Graphics has been decided, judges are likely to rule on these motions
to dismiss.2 97 Many cases that were pending appeal prior to the decision in In re
Silicon Graphics are now being decided by the Ninth Circuit courts, 29 and as a
result of the Ninth Circuit's stringent pleading requirement, appellate courts have
292. Id. at 522 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
293. Howard Mintz, Securities FraudJust Got HarderTo Prove,THE SALT LAKE TRIB., July 8, 1999,
at C7.
294.
Edward Brodsky, Circuits Split on Stock Fraud Scienter Pleading Standard, N.Y.L.J.,
September 8, 1999, at 3 (recognizing that "[i]n light of the sharpness of division between the circuits in their
interpretation of the Reform Act's scienter pleading standard, it is improbable that the circuits will agree
on a consistent standard absent legislative or Supreme Court intervention").
295.
See Davan Maharaj & Henry Weinstein, Ruling Tightens Standardin Investors' FraudSuits
Courts: Shareholders Must Show Company Acted Deliberately, U.S. 9th Circuit Says in Decision
Hailed By High-Tech Executives, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1999, at C 1.
296. Paul Elias & Ellen Rosen, JusticesMay Have To Decide What ScienterApplies In Reform Law,
NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1999, at B I (noting that fewer than 100 of the 643 cases that the Stanford Law School
Securities Clearinghouse tracks had been ruled on).
297. Paul Elias, ShareholderSuits Handcuffed By Court, ZDNET NEws FRoM ZDWRE, July 6, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 14537749 (noting that courts have been waiting for the circuit courts to hand down
their decisions, and as these decisions start to come down many district judges, especially those in
California, will rule on pending motions to dismiss).
298. In re Fritz Co. Sec. Litig., No. 98-15558, 1999 WL 997291 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 1999) (vacating
the judgment of the district court finding that the plaintiff's pleading was sufficient and remanding the
decision for further review in light of In re Silicon Graphics); accord Zeid v. Kimberley, No. 96-20136
SW, 1999 WL 993649 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 1999); see also HeliotropeGen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d
971 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that claims based on a manufacturer's alleged failure to disclose information
about a possible merger did not satisfy the scienter requirement of the PSLRA because the claims did not
state particular information that the defendants should have made public or state particular facts that gave
rise to a strong inference of "deliberate recklessness").
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found that the plaintiffs in most of these cases have failed to satisfy the pleading
standards of the PSLRA. 29
Courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have awaited the In re Silicon Graphics
decision before deciding pending cases .3° The First Circuit recently decided
Greebel v. FTP Software,30' where it found that the PSLRA did not adopt or reject
the motive and opportunity standard or the circumstantial evidence of recklessness standard or alter the First Circuit's prior law on this point, that the PSLRA
did not impose more stringent particularity requirements than those in place in the
First Circuit prior to its passage, that the PSLRA imposed the requirement that
pleadings raise only a "reasonable" rather than "strong" inference of scienter, and
that the PSLRA did not alter the circuit's previous definition of scienter, which
included a recklessness standard that was a lesser form of intent. 30 2 Also recently,
the Fourth Circuit, while declining to interpret the pleading requirements of the
PSLRA as an interpretation not essential to the disposition of the case at bar,
discussed the federal circuit court split as to the interpretation of the PSLRA in
Phillips v. LCI International Inc.3°3 In dicta, the Phillips court noted the
disagreement among the circuits regarding the standard of pleading which best
effectuates Congress' intent in enacting the PSLRA.3 4 Several other circuits have
yet to make explicit rulings interpreting the pleading and scienter requirements
of the PSLRA, and even if they fail to hold in accord with the Ninth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit interpretation is likely to influence their analysis of the issue.30 5
Thus, as additional courts interpret the PSLRA, the full effect of the Ninth Circuit
ruling will become more apparent. 31
B. Impact on Future Plaintiffs
The In re Silicon Graphics decision will have a far-reaching impact on the
ability of private plaintiffs to bring securities fraud actions against corporate
299. Scott Thurm, Technology, Appeals Court Sets High Standard For Shareholders in Stock-Fraud
Suits, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1999, at A23, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5459113 (noting that plaintiffs'
lawyers see the Ninth Circuit's heightened pleading requirement as unfair because prior to discovery
plaintiffs are unlikely to have the evidence necessary to plead with particularity).
300. Elias & Rosen, supra note 296, at B 1.
301.
194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
302. Id. at 188.
303.
190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999).
304. Id.
305.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (discussing the In re Silicon Graphics
holding upon interpreting the PSLRA); accord Greebel v. FTP Software, 194 F.3d 185 (1 st Cir. 1999).

306.
As more cases are decided in the circuit courts, many feel that the likely impact of the
unprecedented In re Silicon Graphics holding will be an appeal of a similar case to the Supreme Court.
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Pleading Scienter Under the PSLRA, N.Y.UJ., July 22, 1999, at 5 (col. 1).

entities.3 °7 Plaintiffs' attorneys fear that if the In re Silicon Graphicsdecision
stands; it will be extremely difficult for plaintiffs to meet the pleading standards
that it imposes with the limited information that plaintiffs, as investors, possess.308
Prior to In re Silicon Graphics,it was possible to bring forth evidence of massive
insider trading to show fraudulent intent on behalf of corporate officers. °9 Much
to the dismay of plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys, in the Ninth Circuit, a
showing of insider trading alone is no longer permissible evidence for securities
fraud actions. 10 Plaintiffs must now evaluate the insider trading in a larger
context, and this context is one that may not be fully apparent to plaintiffs in early
stages of a case.3"'
Additionally, the SEC has expressed concern about the interpretation that the
Ninth Circuit has given to the PSLRA.31 2 In its amicus brief in the In re Silicon
Graphicsappeal, the SEC warned that "[piroving a defendant's actual knowledge
of fraud in a securities case can be a daunting task, particularly when the evidence
is entirely circumstantial.' 31 3 The SEC has also voiced concern regarding the
Ninth Circuit holding that thd scienter requirement was altered by the PSLRA. 1 4
While In re Silicon Graphics was pending on appeal, the SEC lobbied Congress
to include language indicating Congressional intent to adopt the Second Circuit
standards of scienter and pleading in the PSLRA in the newly legislated Uniform
Standards Act. 3 5 Thus, there is active opposition to the Ninth Circuit interpretation of the pleading requirement by the SEC. 316
C. Impact on CorporateEntities
However, the business and technology industries laud the In re Silicon
Graphics decision, as it makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring frivolous
claims.3" 7 As the Ninth Circuit oversees more securities litigation than any other
307. See Scott Thurm, Global Corporate Report: U.S. Court Sets Stock-Fraud Suit Standard,WALL
ST. J. EUROPE, July 7, 1999, at 7.
308. See id.
309. Elias, supra note 297 (noting that "[ilnsider trading has long been the centerpiece of stock fraud
class actions," with plaintiffs' lawyers often filing boilerplate language in their complaints); see also Paul
Elias, SecuritiesRuling Seen As Key ForDefendants N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1999, at 5 (noting that "[f]ully 60
percent of all securities class actions use insider trades as evidence of fraud").
310. Elias, supra note 309, at 5.
311.
See id.
312. See Maharaj & Weinstein, supra note 295, at C I (noting that subsequent to the In re Silicon
Graphics ruling the SEC maintained that "the judge misinterpreted Congress' intent"). In fact, the SEC
has filed amicus briefs in many cases interpreting the pleading requirement of the PSLRA that have gone
up to the circuit court level in an effort to persuade these courts to interpret the PSLRA as adopting the
Second Circuit pleading standard. Walker & Seymour, supra note 12, at 1027.
313.
Walker & Seymour, supra note 12, at 1027.
314.
See id. (noting that the SEC argues that recklessness should not be eliminated as a basis for
liability).
315.
Id.
316. See id.
317. See Maharaj & Weinstein, supra note 295, at C 1; see also Elias, supranote 297.
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federal circuit, the heightened pleading requirements will have a large impact on
such litigation."' Joseph Grundfest, a securities law professor at Stanford Law
School, commented that "[i]n the world of securities class-action legislation, this
is big. It makes it harder to sue [corporations] and it gives them an additional
measure of protection against litigation that they have viewed as harassing and
frivolous. 319 Historically, corporations located in the Ninth Circuit have been
especially vulnerable to allegations of securities fraud.32 ° Many corporations
based in the Ninth Circuit, particularly those located in California, are hightechnology companies, and because the technology industry is so vulnerable to

market forces, high-technology companies often experience plunging stock
prices.21 Prior to the Ninth Circuit ruling, these plunging prices alone were
enough for plaintiffs to make allegations of securities fraud and mismanagement.322 Companies were forced to either litigate, spending enormous amounts
of money while plaintiffs dragged out the discovery process, or settle. 323 Most
companies settled. 324 High-technology corporations were active proponents of the
PSLRA, which they believed would raise the pleading requirements by requiring
particular evidence of fraud, rather than general allegations, to be pled.325
Therefore, these companies are quite pleased with the interpretation that has been
given to the PSLRA by the Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphics.326 However,
whether or not the standard as articulated by In re Silicon Graphics will survive
congressional overhaul or Supreme Court review remains to be seen. 327
VI. THE FUTURE OF IN RE SILICON GRAPHICS

Although lawyers, judges, and corporate executives are split on whether the
318. See Maharaj & Weinstein, supra note 295, at C1.
319. Id.
320. See id.; see also Elias, supra note 297.
321.
See Maharaj & Weinstein, supra note 295, at C 1; see also Elias, supra note 297.
322. See Elias, supra note 309, at 5.
323. Brodsky, supra note 294, at 3; see also Maharaj & Weinstein, supra note 295, at C 1.
324.
Id.; see also Miranda S. Schiller & Haron W. Murage, The Circuit Courts Divide on Key
SecuritiesLitigation Reform Act Issue: PartII, METRo. CORP. CouNs., January, 2000, at I (noting that
in 1998 approximately 235 companies were named as defendants in federal securities fraud class action
lawsuits, and that in 1998 the average settlement amount in such lawsuits was over $10 million).
325.
See Maharaj & Weinstein, supra note 295, at Cl (noting that executives from many high-tech
California corporations joined "corporate America" in 1995 seeking to reform the nation's securities laws
and lobbying Congress to override the Presidential veto pass the PSLRA).
326. See id. (quoting Bruce Vanyo, an attorney for In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., as saying: "This is
wonderful that after four years, we finally have a vindication. Companies that commit real fraud are going
to get sued, ... but companies that don't commit fraud and simply had a bad quarter or unexpected surprises
aren't going to get sued").
327.
See Elias, supra note 309, at 5 (noting that attorneys expect the case to be appealed to the
Supreme Court).

Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA in In re Silicon Graphics was true to
congressional intent, one thing that they all agree on is that the pronounced split
among the circuits will result in Supreme Court review being sought in a future
case interpreting or applying an interpretation of the PSLRA.32 s In fact, Judge
Sneed, in his majority opinion in In re Silicon Graphics,stated that "not all courts
share our view," acknowledging that the issue is one ripe for Supreme Court
review.329 Further, lawyers on both sides of the In re Silicon Graphicscase have
been quoted as saying that they expect a similar case to be appealed to the
Supreme Court.330 It also seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari
if such case is appealed. 33' According to Stanford Law Professor Joseph
Grundfest, "[t]here is a clear split in the circuits now, and that is a key factor the
Supreme Court looks at" when deciding whether or not to grant certiorari.332
Thus, the question seems to be not so much whether the Supreme Court will
consider the issue, but rather what standard the Supreme Court will adopt. 3
The standard that the Supreme Court adopts will likely be a result of both a
plain language approach to the PSLRA 334 and a consideration of the policy behind
the enactment of the PSLRA. 3" The plain language approach to statutory
construction has become the preferred method of judicial interpretation in recent
years.336 If the Court takes a plain language approach, it is unlikely that it will
find that the PSLRA eliminated recklessness as a standard of liability, as all courts
that have interpreted the PSLRA's scienter requirement using only its plain
328. See Mintz, supra note 293, at C7 (noting that both William Lerach, the plaintiffs' attorney, and
Bruce Vanyo, an attorney for In re Silicon Graphics, predict that the Supreme Court will likely have to
define the pleading standards in securities fraud lawsuits).
329. In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Elias & Rosen,
supra note 296, at B 1.
330. See Mintz, supra note 293, at C7; see also Thurm, supra note 307, at 7 (stating that "[a]ttorneys
on both sides of the In re Silicon Graphics case agreed that the U.S. Supreme Court probably will have to
resolve the disputes").
331.
See Mintz, supra note 293, at C7.
332. Id.
333. See Elias & Rosen, supra note 296, at B I (noting that after a "spate" of contradictory circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court may have to determine the scienter standards that will control securities fraud
litigation).
334. See Smith, supra note 12, at 611 (noting that the Supreme Court has recently begun to engage in
a "pattern of statutory interpretation" that favors the use of plain language over legislative history); see also
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (reasoning
that "[t]he starting point in every case involving [the] construction of a statute" is strict adherence to the
plain language of the statute). Justice Scalia, for example, has openly voiced his belief that legislative
history lacks legitimacy because it is not the law itself. See Smith, supra note 12, at 610. Justice Scalia
advocates that courts should be cautious in using legislative history because it is possible that the court
could "create an intent for the legislature where none truly existed." Id. Thus, Justice Scalia maintains that
the only way to properly interpret the intent of a statute is by its plain language. See id.
335. Where the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, as in the area of the level of scienter to be pled
under the PSLRA, the Court is likely to look to the policy aims of Congress, as evidenced in the Conference
Report, in enacting the legislation. See id.
336. See id.; see also Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 173 (stating that, in determining the scope
of section 10(h), the plain meaning of the statute must control).
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language have found that the PSLRA did not eliminate liability for recklessness.337
However, it is not as easy to predict the Supreme Court's plain language
interpretation of the PSLRA's procedural pleading requirement because courts
that have interpreted the pleading requirement using the plain language of the
PSLRA have developed different interpretations of Congress' intent.338 Because
there is nothing in the statute itself that supports a finding that mere allegations
of motive and opportunity, without other evidence, are sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will find the Second
Circuit two-prong test sufficient for pleading scienter.33 9 Thus, it is likely that the
Supreme Court will rule that3 the PSLRA did not codify the Second Circuit
standard of pleading scienter. 40
As a result of the various interpretations that can be given to the plain
language of the PSLRA, it is also likely that the Supreme Court will look to
Congress' purpose in enacting the PSLRA and the policy behind it.34' Because
Congress intended to create more stringent pleading requirements in an attempt
to deter and eliminate frivolous securities litigation in its enactment of the
PSLRA, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court could adopt the Ninth Circuit
interpretation of the heightened pleading standard, reasoning that the Second
Circuit standard does not raise the bar high enough to serve the policy goals of the
PSLRA.3 42 Thus, the Supreme Court is likely to find that a plain language reading
of the statute compels the retention of the Sunstrandrecklessness standard and the
rejection of the Second Circuit pleading standard, and the court is likely to adopt
an interpretation of the statute much like that adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in
Bryant.34'

Until the Supreme Court reviews the PSLRA, however, courts and litigants
alike will be left to grapple with the interpretation of perhaps one of the most
controversial statutes in the area of securities litigation.344 Indeed, it is likely that
both district and appellate courts, even in circuits where an interpretation of the
337. See, e.g., Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286-87; Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533.
338.
CompareBryant, 187 F.3d at 1285 (finding that a proper reading of the plain language of the
PSLRA demonstrates that Congressdid not intend to adopt the Second Circuit standard); with Advanta, 180
F.3d at 534 (finding that a proper reading of the plain language of the PSLRA demonstrates that Congress
intended to adopt the Second Circuit standard).
339.
See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285; see also Giuffra, supra note 306, at 5 (stating that "[t]here is
nothing in the PSLRA that supports the conclusion that allegations of motive and opportunity alone are
sufficient to require a defendant to go to the enormous expense of defending a securities fraud case").
340. See id.
341.
See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286 (holding that, "because the clear purpose of the Reform Act was
to curb abusive securities litigation, and because [the court] believe[s] that the motive and opportunity
analysis is inconsistent with that purpose, [the court] declines to adopt it").
342. See id.
343. See id. at 1284 n.21, 1286.
344. See Elias & Rosen, supra note 296, at B 1.

PSLRA has already been adopted, will encounter a great number of opportunities
to further refine their inierpretations of the PSLRA.3 45 Because each circuit court
formulating an interpretation of the PSLRA has allowed a degree of latitude in the
application of that interpretation, district courts will likely continue to have the
ability to allow for consideration of the specific facts and circumstances in each
particular case they decide.346 Additionally, when district courts do grant motions
to dismiss for failure to meet the pleading requirements of the PSLRA, appeals
from these decisions will be reviewed de novo.347 Thus, the appellate courts will
have additional opportunities to refine their own interpretations of the PSLRA,
possibly adapting them to the facts and circumstances of the particular case under
consideration.348 It is also possible that either the Second or Ninth Circuit will
allow for consideration of the issue en banc. 4 If such consideration is given, it
is possible that either circuit may adopt an interpretation that is very different than
the one each now promulgates. 350 The dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit's
denial of the petition to review the In re Silicon Graphicsdecision en banc is a
sound example of the disagreement that exists regarding the interpretation of the
PSLRA within that circuit alone, and if a fact pattern were to present itself that
were more conducive to a finding for the plaintiffs, a review en banc may yield
far different results than the interpretation given by the court in In re Silicon
Graphics.3 1I Thus, even as the circuits courts have begun to weigh in on the
proper interpretation of the PSLRA, the issue is far from decided. The circuit
courts, Congress, and the Supreme Court may all have an opportunity to devise
the "proper" interpretation of the PSLRA. What that interpretation is remains to
be seen.

ERIN BRADY

35 2

345. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL AND SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW §
2.10 (1999-2000 ed. 1999).
346.
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347. See BLOOMENTHAL AND WOLFF, supra note 345, at § 2.10.
348. See id.
349. See id.; see also Marc J. Sonnenfeld and Karen Pieslak Pohlmann, The Continuing Evolution of
the Standardfor Pleading Scienter Under the Reform Act, METRO. CORP. CouNs., November, 1999, at
6 (noting that "the plaintiffs' bar is likely to press for review of [the] issue, possibly by the Supreme Court").
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351. See id.; see also In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 195 F.3d 521, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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